Using a large administrate dataset covering the universe of phone calls and airtime transfers in a country over a four year period, we examine the pattern of adoption of airtime transfers over time. We start by documenting strong network e¤ects: increased usage of the new airtime transfer service by social neighbors predicts a higher adoption probability.
Introduction
It has often been observed that the adoption of new products and services, and other behavioral changes, seems to di¤use along social networks (references). What is less clear is why. The purpose of this paper is to throw some light on the issue using a large dataset about the adoption of a new phone service over time. To keep things straightforward, we speak throughout of adoption of a new product, but the same principles generally apply to new services or to the adoption of behavioral changes.
There are many possible reasons why adoption may spread along social networks. One is that some individuals get to know of a new product. People talk about new products with others in their network of acquaintances, so that information about the existence of the new product spreads through social learning. A proportion of those informed of the new product adopt it, and since adoption requires knowing about the new product, adoption is observed to di¤use by social contact, in a way similar to the way an epidemic spreads in a population.
Other forms of social learning are possible as well. For instance, people may learn about the hidden qualities of a new product through usage. The decision to adopt may depend on what people know of these hidden qualities, such as how useful or reliable the new product really is. If too little information is available, risk averse individuals refrain from adopting. It follows that, as people share information about hidden characteristics of the new product along social networks, adoption spreads. The main di¤erence with the …rst type of social learning is that here more usage by social neighbors provides cumulative information that is valuable for the adoption decision, over and above simply knowing that the product exists.
Di¤usion along social networks may also occur for reasons having nothing to do with social learning. One particular case is network externalities or, more precisely, strategic complementarities in adoption decisions. If adoption by my social neighbors increases my incentive to adopt, I am more likely to adopt following adoption by my neighbors. This mechanism may arise even when all agents have full information about the existence and qualities of the product, although it may be combined with social learning. The main di¤erence with social learning is that network externalities do not wear o¤: they continue to reinforce adoption long after any hidden information about the new product would have been learned. Strategic complementarities may arise for many di¤erent reasons, some good -the usefulness of the product increases with more widespread usage -some bad -adoption protects me against some of the negative externalities generated by widespread usage. The canonical example of a strategic complementarity that arises from a negative externality is the installation of a burglar alarm: when I install an alarm, I
initially displace crime towards neighbors, which raises their incentive to install a burglar alarm; in equilibrium, everyone incurs the cost of having a burglar alarm but it no longer serves as deterrent (reference).
In this paper we seek to identify the respective roles of network externalities and social learning in the adoption of a new service o¤ered to mobile phone users. We also seek to identify the relative importance of social learning about product existence vs. its hidden qualities. To do this, we rely on a large dataset that includes all phone calls made by mobile phone users of a large monopolistic provider in an entire country for a period of four years. While the dataset includes many observations, each observation contains a limited amount of information.
We compensate for this to the best of what the data allows by including di¤erent types of …xed e¤ects to capture unobserved heterogeneity. We …nd robust evidence suggestive of social learning both for the existence and the quality of the product. In contrast, we …nd that network e¤ects turn negative after …rst adoption, suggesting that airtime transfers are strategic substitutes among network neighbors. This paper complement a large literature documenting the di¤usion of new products and behaviors on social networks (e.g., Krystakis and Fowler 2007, Centola 2010) . Our contribution to this literature is to decompose network e¤ects into di¤erent components and to measuring the sign and magnitude of these components. We …nd that network e¤ects need all be strategic complements, are is commonly assumed in the descriptive empirical literature. [MORE LINKS
TO THE LITERATURE NEEDED HERE]
The paper is organized as follows. We start in Section 2 by presenting the conceptual framework and testing strategy. The information available in the raw data is discussed in Section 3, together with a description of how we use the raw data to construct the variables used in our analysis. Empirical results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Conceptual framework
The focus of our attention is adoption, that is, the …rst usage of a new product or service by someone who has not used it before. We are interested in how social networks in ‡uence adoption.
To formalize this process, let y it = f0; 1g be a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if individual i uses the product at time t, and 0 otherwise. We think of time as a sequence of time intervals, i.e., our model is in discrete time. Adoption describes the …rst time at which y it > 0 for individual i.
Let t i denote the time at which individual i becomes 'at risk'of adopting the product. 1 Further let T i denote the time at which individual i …rst uses the product. Finally, let T denote the last data period for which we have information. By de…nition, T i > T for an individual who, by time T , has not yet used the product.
As we will argue below, usage after adoption provides useful information as well. Usage y it can therefore be divided into two vectors or periods: the time until …rst usage fy it i ; :::y iT i g; and usage after that fy iT i +1 ; :::y iT g. By construction, fy it i ; :::y iT i g is either a sequence of 0's ending with a single 1, or a string of 0's (for someone who never adopts). The length of each of the two i vectors varies across individuals.
We are interested in identifying predictors of y it that depend on the adoption and usage behavior of the social neighbors of i. To do so e¤ectively, we present a few simple concepts before articulating our testing strategy. We …rst discuss social learning, before introducing network externalities. We assume throughout that the researcher has information about y it .
Social learning about product existence
There is much to learn from simple models of social learning. Let us …rst focus on information about the existence of the product. We then turn to information about the qualities of the product. We end with a short discussion of experimentation, which is adoption purely for the purpose of eliciting information about product quality. The focus of this section is to use simple models to develop intuition about social learning that we can then take to the data.
Learning about the existence of the new product closely resembles a contagion process.
Without information about the existence of the product, the agent simply cannot adopt. Hence having been exposed to information about the product is a necessary condition for adoption.
This information can come from two sources: (1) information received from various sources outside the social network (e.g., ads on billboard, radio, TV, junk mail, or newspaper); and (2) information received from the social network (e.g., friends, relatives, co-workers).
Let vt denote the probability of receiving information from outside the social network in location v at time t. We take this probability as given and we do not seek to model its determinants. But we think of it as having a strong local component, capturing the local nature of advertisement coverage.
A simple model for the probability of receiving information from a social source at time t can be formulated as:
Pr(i receives information from network at t + 1) = 1 (1 q)
where A it is the number of neighbors of i who have started using the product in period t -and thus have become aware of its existence and can relay this information to i. We assume that the researcher observes A it , or a close proxy. The cumulative probability that i has received information about the existence of the product is thus an increasing and convex function of the cumulative number of i's neighbors who have adopted at t -and thus could have passed information about the product to i with probability q during that time period.
Let us now the two sources of information. If we assume independence between vt and the signal received from each neighbor, the probability of not being informed within period t is (1 vt )(1 q) A it . Now let us assume that, once i is informed that the product exists, i adopts with probability p i . This is the probability of usage in any given period, conditional on knowing about the product. For some individuals this probability is low; for others it is high.
Over time the likelihood of having heard of the product increases. Formally, the probability of not having heard of the product between time t i and t is:
where A it is the cumulative number of adopting neighbors between t i and t, that is:
If vt is constant over time for location v, the formula simpli…es to:
where S it is the time elapsed between t i and t, that is:
where t i is the time at which i begins being exposed to information about the product's existence.
The probability that agent i adopts the product at time t is the probability that he has been informed times p i :
Pr(y it+1 = 1jfy it i ; :::; y it g = f0; :::
Adoption can take place even for someone who has no social neighbors, or whose neighbors have not adopted. The model predicts that the likelihood of adoption increases in a systematic fashion over time, without or without adopting neighbors. This is a mechanical e¤ect: as time passes, the agent has more and more chances of hearing about the product. The probability of …rst adoption increases with time since inception S it and with A it , although in both cases the e¤ect is concave: the derivative of the probability of adoption w.r.t. S it and A it falls with S it and with A it . This is because having heard about the product once is enough to know of its existence.
Once the product has been used once, i may continue using it with a certain probability.
But if the only source of network e¤ects is social learning about the existence of the product, the probability of usage after …rst adoption is no longer a function of the number of adopting neighbors. Formally we have:
In the learning about existence model, the certainty that i has learned about the existence of the product immediately shifts the estimation model from (2.1) to (2.2). In contrast, in the learning about quality model, the data generating process remains (2.6) since, by assumption, the person is assumed to know about the product from the beginning. This makes it possible to test the two learning models against each other even in a reduced form.
An identical prediction is made if the researcher observes a signal M it that is equal to 1 when individual i has unambiguously been made aware of the existence of the new product, and 0 otherwise:
To recap, when network neighbors circulate information about product existence and nothing more, the probability of adoption increases in the number of adopting neighbors, but at a decreasing rate. After …rst adoption or after becoming aware of the product, subsequent usage does not depend on the number of adopting neighbors.
Social learning about product quality
We get di¤erent predictions if social learning is about product quality. In this case, the decision to adopt at time t depends not on the probability of receiving a signal within a given time interval, but rather on the cumulative information about the product received up to time t.
To keep the same notation, let vt now denote the probability that individual i receives an independent signal about the quality of the product at time t. This probability can vary over time t and across locations v. To keep things simple, let us assume that this signal takes only two values, 0 and 1, i.e., a bad signal or a good signal. Let denote the true probability that the product performs: a high good always performs well, while a low good often performs poorly. Individuals di¤er in how much they value unobserved quality -more about this later.
We assume that the posterior belief of individual i at time t is simply the sample estimate of the unknown Bernoulli parameter based on the information available to i at time t. 2 Let N it be the number of signals received by i at up to t and let N 1 it be the number of signals with value 1, i.e., the number of good signals. We have:
The variance of this belief is approximately given by:
As sample size increases, p it tends to and v 2 it tends to 0. 3
Since we do not observe what signal people observe, we never know what N 1 it is. But we can write:
In other words, the information people have is, on average, unbiased and the variance of their beliefs shrinks over time.
If we allow agents to hold a prior belief p i0 , this belief can be regarded as coming from a sample of observations N i0 that we do not observe. The point estimate of this belief marks how biased the prior belief is, and the size of the sample determines how con…dent the agent is in his prior belief. This can be formalized as follows:
where p b it now denotes the posterior belief of agent i at t.
We do not observe p i0 and N i0 . If we let the number of signals received be denoted n it , beliefs can be written as following a model of the form:
As with uninformed priors, beliefs p b it tend to over time, but they show some persistence around initial priors. 4 Having modelled learning, we now turn to adoption. We start without prior beliefs. We assume that individuals di¤er in the threshold value of that they require before adopting.
At …rst glance, it seems that we could simply assume that people adopt if their estimate of 4 The variance 2 it is not monotonic over time, however. Intuition is as follows. Imagine the agent starts with a strong prior far from (a strong prior means Ni0 is large). Initially 2 it is quite small because it is dominated by the strong prior. As more information is revealed, posterior beliefs are progressively pulled away from prior pi0 and 2 it increases. Eventually posterior beliefs settle on and the variance falls, dominated now by Nit. is larger than some value i with 0 < i < 1. This decision rule, however, is too crude. It predicts that people adopt after a single good signal since, in that case, their posterior belief is p i1 = 1 i for any i . This is clearly an unappealing decision rule because an estimate of based on a single observation is very imprecise. To capture this intuition in the simplest possible way, we posit that the expected utility of adoption E[U it (y it = 1)j! it ] can be written as a mean-variance form. 5 We have:
where R is a risk aversion parameter and i is now a threshold value of expected utility. Since we do not observe p it and v 2 it directly, we replace them by formulas (2.3) and (2.4) above and we get:
Pr(y it+1 = 1jfy it i ; :::; y it g = f0; :::; 0g) = Pr ( i ) R
(1 ) n it e it+1 (2.5) Equation (2.5) shows that the probability of adoption increases with n it . The intuition is straightforward: the variance term shrinks and vanishes at the limit, and this raises the expected utility of adoption for some people. Not everybody adopts, however, because is not higher than i for everyone.
We can now generalize the above to the case where people hold prior beliefs. We now have:
Pr(y it+1 = 1jfy it i ; :::; y it g = f0; :::; 0g) =
To close the model, we need to stipulate the data generating process of n it , the number of signals received. In practice, we do not observe n it but, by analogy with the previous subsection, we expect it to be an increasing function of time since inception S it and of the number of adopting neighbors A it . To show this formally, let us assume that in each period individual i receives a signal from outside his network with a constant location-speci…c probability v , 6 and with probability q individual i receive a signal from any newly adopting neighbor. The expected number of signals received at time t is a sum of two binomial processes. The average number of signals received outside the network up to time is given by a binomial process with parameter v and S it , and is simply v S it . The average number of signals from the networks is qA it . Thus we have: 7
Without prior beliefs, the probability of adoption can thus be written:
Pr(y it+1 = 1jfy it i ; :::; y it g = f0; :::; 0g) = Pr (
(2.8) Equation (2.8) shows that the probability of …rst adoption is monotonically increasing in S it and A it .
The probability of adoption with prior beliefs is similarly obtained by replacing n it in equation (2.6) by its value given by (2.7). Our earlier observation remains valid: with strong prior beliefs, the variance term that multiplies R in equation (2.6) can initially be quite small. If the prior belief p i0 is high and its variance v 2 i0 is small, individual i will adopt immediately. The social learning model therefore predict that individuals with strong optimistic priors adopt early. So doing, they receive information about the quality of the product, information that they may circulate among their social circle. If the information is su¢ ciently bad, i.e., if revealed quality is less than i , early adopters will abandon the new product, and the information that di¤uses among the social network will discourage adoption by others. If the information is su¢ ciently good, its di¤usion in the network will progressively raise posterior beliefs according to equation What happens after an individual has adopted the product once? In the context of our empirical application, it is natural to assume that usage reveals a lot of relevant information about the product. To capture this idea in a stylized way, let us imagine that using the product once perfectly reveals the quality of the product. It follows that usage is now driven by i ; social learning no longer matters. Formally we have:
which does not depend on time or adopting neighbors.
What happens if individual i is observed to receive an unambiguous signal revealing the existence of the product? In this case, this signal does not, by itself, dispel uncertainty about the quality of the product and thus should not eliminate the role of social learning in reducing uncertainty about the net bene…t of adoption. In other words, adoption continues to follow equation (2.6) after M it = 1. This is di¤erent from what happens when social learning only a¤ects knowledge about the existence of the product, and thus provides a way of identifying which type of social learning is present in the data.
To summarize, when social learning is about product quality, the likelihood of adoption is predicted to increase over time as the number of adopting neighbors rises, irrespective of whether the individual received a signal about product existence or not. After …rst adoption, however, the role of social learning essentially disappears and the probability of continued usage is no longer a function of the number of adopting neighbors.
Individual experimentation
So far we have ignored the possibility that an individual may experiment with a product in order to learn its quality. If the cost of a single usage is large, such experimentation may be strongly discouraged. But if the cost of a single usage is small, it may be optimal for an individual to experiment individually rather than waiting to learn from others.
Formally introducing experimentation into our model goes well beyond the scope of this paper. But it is fairly straightforward to see how it would a¤ect our predictions so far. If social learning is non-existent, the only way people can learn about the quality of the product is to experiment themselves. The presence of social learning, however, generates an option value of waiting: individual may simply free-ride on the experimentation of others, and wait to receive information through their network (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig 1996) .
How does this observation a¤ect model predictions? Intuitively, individuals who are socially well connected can anticipate to receive a lot of information through their network and thus have a high option value of waiting; in contrast, individuals who are not well connected have a low value of waiting and thus are more likely to experiment by themselves. 8 It follows that, other things being equal, high degree individuals have a lower Pr(y it = 1jfy it i ; :::; y it 1 g = f0; :::; 0g) than low degree individuals.
Let the network degree of individual i at t be denoted as B it . This degree includes all direct neighbors of i, irrespective of whether they have already adopted or not. We expect Pr(y it = 1)
to be a non-increasing function of B it , e.g.:
Experimentation does not indicate 'adoption'in the usual sense: experimentation can reveal to the individual that the product is not suitable for them, i.e., that its quality falls below i -in which case they would never use it again. This means that people who adopt early because of a low B i are also more likely to abandon the product after having used it once. Thus we have:
These predictions are empirical testable if the researcher has information about B it .
Network externalities and strategic complementarities
Social learning can be seen as a network externality: individuals bene…t from the information accumulated and shared by others. We have shown that social learning generates a correlation between neighbors'adoption and own adoption by individual i. There are many other network externalities that do not involve learning. Some of these externalities may occur geographically, others may be speci…c to the social network. Since we do not have any information to further disentangle di¤erent types of strategic complementarities, we need not discuss them in more detail. The main distinction between these strategic complementarities and social learning is that the e¤ect of social learning disappears after i has used the product at least once; the e¤ect of other strategic complementarities do not. This simple observation forms the basis of our identi…cation strategy between social learning and other network externalities.
Testing strategy
We are now ready to put all these predictions together in the form of a regression model. To recap, if network e¤ects are purely due to social learning, then they disappear after …rst usage.
If they are purely due to other strategic complementarities, the data generating process should be the same before and after …rst adoption. To distinguish between the two types of social learning, we need to observe a signal M it which equal 1 when i is unambiguously informed of the product's existence -even though i has not adopted it. If such signal is observed by the researcher, identi…cation between the two comes from the following observation: when social learning is purely about product existence, once i has learned about the existence of the product, the data generating process immediately shifts from (2.1) to (2.2). In contrast, if social learning is about product quality, the data generating process remains (2.6) until …rst adoption. This makes it possible to test the two learning models against each other in reduced form.
The reduced form for models (2.1) and (2.6) is similar and can be written as:
Pr(y it+1 = 1jfy it i ; :::; y it g = f0; :::; 0g)
Model (2.10) is a simple linear approximation of the two structural models (2.1) and (2.6). Parameter i captures variation in product usefulness across individuals. With any social learning we expect 2 > 0 on average. We also expect 1 > 0: the likelihood of adoption should increase over time as more information about the product becomes more generally available, form within and outside the social network. In regression model (2.11) we have included extra terms to test the concavity of the relationship with respect to S it and A it as predicted by social learning about product existence. This concavity can be investigated by testing 3 < 0; 4 < 0 and 5 < 0. 9
In contrast, the reduced form model for (2.2) is of the form:
Pr(y it+1 = 1jfy it i ; :::; y it g = f0; :::; 0g; M is = 1 for some s t)
It is therefore easy to test one model against the other by estimating a regression model of the form:
with m it = 1 if M is = 1 for some s t, and = 0 otherwise. As before i captures variation in product usefulness across individuals. If the true model is social learning only about existence, then all 's should be equal to 0. If the true model is only social learning about quality, then all 's should be equal to the corresponding 's. If we reject both hypothesis -and the total marginal e¤ect of S it and A it on the dependent variable is smaller when m it = 1 -it means that the true model is a hybrid of the two forms of social learning.
A similar approach can be used to test the presence of network externalities and strategic complementarities driven by factors other than social learning. Identi…cation is achieved simply by noting that social learning stops once i has adopted, while other network externalities continue having an in ‡uence on usage even after i is familiar with the product and its characteristics.
Formally, let z it = 1 if y is = 1 for some s < t, and 0 otherwise. In other words, z it = 1 if i has already used the product prior to period t. The estimated model is of the form:
Unlike models (2.11) and (2.12), regression model (2.13) includes observations before and after …rst adoption. If there is no social learning, network e¤ects should be the same before and after …rst adoption, i.e., we should observe that 2 = 4 = 5 = 0. If there are no network e¤ects other than social learning, then we should observe that whatever network e¤ects were present before …rst adoption should cancel out after …rst adoption, i.e., that:
which is guaranteed if 2 = 2 , 4 = 4 and 5 = 5 . If the data generating process is characterized by a combination of social learning and strategic complementarities, then we should observe that:
Estimating model (2.13) allows us to test this as well.
The data
The data we use to test our conceptual framework is administrative data on the usage and di¤usion of a mobile phone service entitled ME2U. The service was introduced in Rwanda in September 2006 by the dominant mobile phone operator at the time. This service allows subscribers to transfer airtime to another subscriber at no cost. In February 2010 the operator added the possibility for subscribers to redeem airtime into cash, thereby formally introducing Mobile Money to the country. Over the period of our study, airtime could only be transferred to another subscriber. 10 Our outcome of interest is the action of sending airtime to another subscriber. From the moment ME2U was introduced in the country, no action was required (e.g., registration or fee)
for a subscriber to receive airtime. Hence observing that a subscriber receives airtime at a given point in time does not imply a voluntary decision to use the service. Nonetheless, it does unambiguously inform the recipient that peer-to-peer airtime transfers are in existence. Knowing that it is possible to transfer airtime to someone else does not, by itself, confer full information about the usefulness of the service to a particular user. There are many attributes that subscribers may care about, such as easy-of-use, reliability, speed of execution, and protection against abuse or theft. Talking to other users about their experience sending airtime to others may therefore confer useful information to prospective users.
Network externalities may arise once the practice of transferring airtime across subscribers is su¢ ciently widespread in a particular social or geographical grouping. For instance, it would become easier to solicit small airtime transfers from friends and relatives in order to make a call or send a message, since they would be familiar with how to send airtime. It may also become possible to purchase or otherwise obtain airtime from strangers, e.g., on the bus home. Hence network e¤ects may continue to manifest themselves even after a subscriber is fully acquainted with the service.
In the remainder of this section we begin by describing the source and structure of the data used in the analysis. Next we de…ne all the variables used in this study and we explain how they are constructed. Last we present descriptive statistics on the variables used in the empirical section.
Data source
The data come from a large telecommunications operator. During the period of investigation, this operator enjoyed a quasi-monopoly on mobile phones in Rwanda. Access to the data was granted by Nathan Eagle through remote access to a Northeastern University computer server under conditions of strict con…dentiality. 11 This is a large dataset comprising multiple computergenerated administrative …les. We use two main bodies of data for our analysis: data on airtime transfers; and data on phone calls. The former are used to study adoption and di¤usion; the latter is used to de…ne social networks. The data identi…es subscribers through an anonymized identi…er based on their phone number/SIM card. The same identi…er is used throughout the data. We do not have information on the name or personal characteristics of individual users. 12
The call data consist of an exhaustive log of all phone-based activity that occurred from the To avoid spurious inference, our analysis is based solely on airtime transfer data between September 2006 and July 2008. During this period, transferring airtime was free, and the number and amount of transfers that a user could send per day was not limited. Receiving or sending airtime could be done without the need to subscribe to the service -ME2U became available to all subscribers immediately after its introduction. The only requirement a user needed to ful…l to use the service is to have su¢ cient credit on his phone. When a user sends an airtime transfer, the amount sent is deducted from the user's airtime balance, the same balance that is used to make calls or send text messages. Topping up one's balance can be done by buying airtime vouchers from local shops and street vendors.
Since all phone usage in Rwanda is prepaid, topping up by purchasing a voucher is a regular task for all subscribers, irrespective of whether they use ME2U or not. When a transfer is received, the amount is immediately added to the recipient's balance. This airtime can immediately be used to make calls, send airtime to other subscribers, or resell airtime to others.
In February 2010 the operator introduced a system by which subscribers could redeem airtime against cash with dedicated agents. During the period covered by our data, such a system had not yet been introduced. For information, we give in Appendix Figure A1 the location of all cell towers in Rwanda during our period of analysis.
Variable de…nition
Because the number of unique subscribers in the data is extremely large, we only use a randomly selected subset of 5,000 subscribers for our analysis of ME2U adoption and usage. 14 For these subscribers, we observe all their ME2U transfers between the introduction of the service in For the purpose of our analysis, we aggregate all phone usage information at the weekly level.
This ensures that we take advantage of the detailed time information available in the data while keeping the size of the dataset manageable. For instance, ME2U usage by network neighbors is measured as the total number of neighbors who start using ME2U in a given week -more below.
As indicated in the conceptual section, all regressors are lagged -by one week. This eliminates the risk of simultaneity bias since actual usage of ME2U by individual i in week t could not have caused usage by network neighbors in the previous week. This issue is discussed more in detail in the empirical section.
We start by de…ning the dependent variable y i;t , which is a dummy that takes value 1 if i has used ME2U in period t, and 0 otherwise. We consider a subscriber to be active from the week he receives or makes his …rst transaction -e.g., phone call, SMS, or ME2U transaction.
This de…nes t i , that is, the week from which i is at risk of adopting ME2U. The adoption date T i for individual i is de…ned as the week at which the subscriber sends his …rst ME2U transfer.
The reason for de…ning adoption in this way is that sending airtime requires an active decision while receiving a transfer is passive. In order to send a transfer, the subscriber may also need to invest time and e¤ort, e.g., to top up his airtime balance or to learn how to make a transfer.
In contrast, the only requirement for a subscriber to receive a ME2U transfer is to have an activated phone number.
We construct the neighborhood of each subscriber as follows. We look in the data for all subscribers who, at some point between January 2005 and June 2008, have a phone contact with i. To be clear, this includes all subscribers in the data, not just those 5,000 subscribers randomly selected for the empirical analysis. We only use call data with a positive duration and from mobile to mobile phone -ME2U cannot be sent to a landline or to an international number. 15 We start from the dataset of all phone calls made between January 2005 and July 2008, and we identify the week in which i and j had their …rst phone-based contact. When i and j make the …rst phone call to each other, the network tie g i;j;t switches from 0 to 1. For the purpose of the econometric analysis we assume that, once connected, i an j stay connected during the span of our analysis. The network ties are thus de…ned as:
1 if i and j had their …rst phone-based contact in period s with s = t i ; :::; t 0 otherwise (3.1)
The neighborhood of subscriber i in period t is the union of all the subscribers for which g ijt = 1.
That is:
Next, for each neighbor j of i we collate information on whether j made a ME2U transfer in week t, that is, whether y jt = 1. We then construct a variable A it de…ned as the number of neighbors of i who started sending airtime in week t. Accumulating A it over time yields the cumulative number of adopting neighbors A it of i at week t.
In the conceptual section we introduced a variable M it de…ned as a signal that i receives at time t that the new service exists. In the empirical implementation of the model, we set M it = 1 in the …rst week that i receives a ME2U transfer. Variable m it permanently switches to 1 once M it has taken value 1. Finally, variable S it is de…ned as the number of weeks since i started using his SIM-ID -that is, S it t t i .
Descriptive statistics
We now provide summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. Remember that these variables relate to the 5,000 subscribers randomly selected for analysis. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables; Tables 2 and 3 provide the same information, but split between before and after i receives his …rst airtime transfer.
The total number of observations is quite large, even when we limit our attention to 5,000 subscribers. We see that the neighborhood of each subscriber is large, as could be expected given our generous de…nition of social links. There is ample variation in A it and A it , both before and after i receives his …rst airtime transfer, to hope achieving identi…cation. 
Empirical results
The …rst regression model we estimate is (2.11), using only observations until …rst adoption. To eliminate the individual …xed e¤ect i , we …rst di¤erence the data. The estimated model is thus of the form:
Pr( y it+1 = 1jfy it i ; :::; y it g = f0; :::
where x t x t x t 1 by de…nition of notation. We have S it = 1 by construction. Coe¢ cient estimates are presented in Table 4 . We see that 2 and 3 are both signi…cantly positive while 4 is signi…cantly negative. Remember that, when social learning is about product existence, the relationship between adoption and network e¤ects should be strongly concave with respect to A it . In contrast, when social learning is about product quality, this concavity need not be To investigate this, we report in Table 5 the marginal e¤ect @ Pr =@A it evaluated at various values of A it . We …nd that marginal e¤ects are positive throughout, consistent with the presence of network e¤ects. We observe a gradual fall in @ Pr =@A it as A it increases, as suggested by the negative quadratic term coe¢ cient 4 . This evidence is prima facie consistent with social learning about product existence, although the observed concavity is much weaker than that predicted by equation (2.1).
In Table 6 we present coe¢ cient estimates for regression model (2.12). Once again, we eliminate the individual …xed e¤ect i by …rst-di¤erencing the data. The estimated model is thus of the form:
In Table 7 we present estimates of marginal e¤ects @ Pr =@A it evaluated for m it = 0 and m it = 1.
Network e¤ects remain signi…cant throughout, although they are signi…cantly smaller when m it = 1 than when m it = 0. This is suggestive of a hybrid model in which social learning serves two purposes: circulating information about product existence, and about product quality.
Given that network e¤ects remain large even after m it = 1 suggests that, of the two, di¤using information about quality accounts for a large share of social learning e¤ects.
We now seek to rule out that observed network e¤ects on adoption are purely due to network externalities, not to social learning. To this e¤ect, we estimate model (2.13) in the same data.
The model is estimated in …rst di¤erence to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity i , i.e., it is of the form:
where z it = 1 if subscriber i has used ME2U before time t. Regression results are presented in Table 8 . Marginal e¤ects estimated at the sample mean are presented in Table 9 . As should be, the coe¢ cient estimates are very similar to those reported in Table 4 , and the average marginal e¤ect is similar as well. We …nd that the marginal e¤ect estimated at the sample mean is much lower after …rst adoption, which con…rms that social learning matters. What is less anticipated is that, after …rst adoption, network e¤ects are on average negative, implying that, if anything, airtime transfers are strategic substitutes across network neighbors.
To check the robustness of this …nding, we re-estimate (4.3) in two alternative ways. Results are presented in columns 2 and 3 of Tables 8 and 8 . We start in column 2 by adding a time trend to the regression. The concern is that the usage of airtime transfers by network neighbors may be varying over time in a way that is correlated with a time trend. Omitting this trend may result in a spurious negative correlation between neighbor usage and own usage that varies systematically before and after …rst adoption. We do …nd evidence of a time trend in airtime transfer usage -the trend coe¢ cient is strongly statistically signi…cant. But this has little e¤ect on coe¢ cient estimates and on marginal e¤ects estimated at the mean: In column 3 we add controls for the transfers received by i. The logic is as follows. We begin by noting that A it captures airtime transfers made by i's network neighbors at time t 1.
Some of these transfers may have been made to i. If i feels an obligation to reciprocate or pass on the transfers received, we expect to observe a mechanical positive correlation between y it+1
and A it . If, on the other hand, i receives transfers because he or she is at the receiving end of an altruistic relationship (e.g., a migrant sending remittances to his family, a husband sending airtime to his wife or children) and an airtime transfer is made when the recipient is in need of assistance, y it+1 and A it may be negatively correlated in the sense that the more i needs assistance, the more he or she receives airtime transfers, hence the larger A it . At the same time, the more i needs assistance, the less i can help others and hence the lower y it+1 is.
To investigate whether this is what drives the negative
after …rst adoption, we reestimate (4.3) with four additional regressors: a time trend, as in column 2; the number of transfers received at t, the amount of airtime transfers received at t, and the number of neighbors from whom i received a transfer at t. Coe¢ cient estimates are signi…cant but their interpretation is somewhat confusing. Two of the coe¢ cients are negative, in agreement with our conjecture above, indicating that when i receives more transfers from more people, he or she is less likely to transfer airtime to others during the next period. The third coe¢ cient, however, (amount received) is positive, indicating the opposite e¤ect. More importantly, the estimate marginal e¤ect
remains negative and signi…cant -and the change in magnitude relative to column 2 is relatively small (e.g., from -0.0030 to -0.0028). From this we conclude that the strategic substitution e¤ect of network neighbors is not simply due to transfers received by i from these network neighbors -and either reciprocated or not in the subsequent period.
Network externalities are typically believed to generate strategic complement e¤ects. How could airtime transfers be strategy substitutes after …rst adoption? It is di¢ cult to say for sure from the data at our disposal. But strategic substitution e¤ects have been discussed in the theoretical literature on networks (e.g., Jackson 2008, Bramoulle, Kranton and d'Amours 2014) and evidence of network strategic substitutes has been provided in the case of the adoption of business practices (e.g., Fafchamps and Soderbom 2014) . In our context, strategic substitutes may arise from free-riding. To illustrate, suppose i has two network neighbors j and k. If j has given airtime to k at time t, there is less pressure on i to give at time t + 1. Individual i may feel exonerated even if k is not a direct neighbor of i. This may be what explains why neighbors of individuals who send transfers send fewer transfers themselves.
Whatever the reason for strategic substitution e¤ects, the main lesson we draw from our analysis is that, prior to …rst adoption, networks serve an important social learning role. Moreover, given the presence of negative externalities, the importance of social learning may be underestimated by regressions (4.1) and (4.2). For instance, if we combine the two estimates from the column 1 of Table 9 , we would conclude that
underestimates the network e¤ect of social learning by 74% (i.e., -0.00356/0.00483). Comparisons made using the other two columns are slightly lower, but continue to suggest a signi…cant underestimation of social learning from models (4.1) and (4.2)
Conclusion
In this study we use a large administrate dataset covering the universe of phone calls and airtime transfers in an entire country over a four year period. We examine the pattern of adoption of a new phone service over time. This phone service, called ME2U, allows a phone user to transfer airtime from their phone to someone else's. This early form of mobile money was introduced in Rwanda in 2005 by the then de facto monopolist in cell phone services. As a result, we observe the entire universe of peer-to-peer airtime transfers that took place in Rwanda over a four year period.
We start by documenting strong network e¤ects on adoption of the new service: increased us- Table 2 . Evaluated at sample means of regressors. Note: Standard error are clustered at the district level (M=27). Table 4 Evaluated at sample means of regressors. Note: Standard error are clustered at the district level (M=27). Table 6 Evaluated at sample means of regressors. Note: Standard error are clustered at the district level (M=27).
